Election-Based Rotation in Elective Office

An independent Rotation Research project on the structural design of term-limit and eligibility systems.

Election-based rotation refers to eligibility systems in which service is limited by the number of elections a person may win, rather than years served, consecutive terms, or norms of voluntary rotation.

The Twenty-Second Amendment’s limit on presidential elections is a familiar example of this type of eligibility architecture.

This site examines how eligibility rules and rotation systems function over time, with particular attention to how coherent designs achieve self-execution, durability under institutional stress, and how commonly used term-limit language can generate ambiguity, unequal application, or predictable structural weaknesses.

The site provides an analytical framework that can be applied to real-world proposals, statutes, and institutional designs, including through the use of AI reasoning systems, to test coherence and return logical analysis.

What we do

• Define rotation as a structural system and identify features associated with coherence, equal application, and durability

• Examine designs for failure modes such as resets, exemptions, laundering, and ambiguity

• Publish neutral reference materials suitable for clarification when needed

Analytical Framework

Models and evaluates rotation systems across jurisdictions, enabling testing of coherence, equal application, equal duration, finite transition, durability, and predictable failure modes in rotation system design.

Reference Draft

The Equal-Duration Congressional Term Limits Amendment (Rev. 3.1C) is provided as a neutral reference text applying the Framework, for analytical testing and discussion of structural design.

Case Library

A curated collection of recent, real-world examples drawn from public reporting, suitable for testing using the Framework.